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Soviet war crimes trials under Stalin (1943-1953)
 
1
 
The prosecution of Nazi war crimes was the first item on the agenda of the anti-
Hitler coalition. As early as October 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill publicly
declared that retribution for Nazi crimes was one of the major purposes of the war.
Two years later, the United Nations War Crimes Commission was established
(without participation of the Soviet Union) and the foreign ministers of the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union signed the “Declaration of German Atrocities”
in Moscow. The international negotiations about the legal prosecution of Nazi
criminals reached their peak with the establishment of the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) in 1945.
 
2
 
 
However, the first public war crimes trial had already taken place much earlier
in the liberated territories of the Soviet Union, in July 1943, in Krasnodar. The
defendants were not German criminals, but eleven local Soviet collaborators, who
were members of the SS Special Detachment 10a”
 
 
 
responsible for the deaths of
thousands of people. Among other crimes, the SS unit had murdered 7,000 Soviet
people (mostly Jews) in poison gas vans in Krasnodar. The defendants were
represented by well-known Soviet attorneys, and hundreds of spectators attended
the trial, including correspondents of the Soviet and international press, (among
them Aleksei Tolstoi). Eight of the defendants were sentenced to death by hanging,
 
1. Being a Pearl Resnick fellow at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the USHMM
(US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington), I had the possibility to work with the
museum’s unique collection of trials related to the Holocaust in the occupied Soviet territories.
For his friendly support I want to thank Vadim Altskan.
2. See Norbert Frei, “Nach der Tat. Die Ahndung deutscher Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in
Europa — eine Bilanz,” in N. Frei, ed., 
 
Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik: Der Umgang
mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg
 
, (Göttingen:
Wallstein, 2006), 7-15.
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three to long prison terms.
 
3
 
 The verdict was greeted with applause by those present,
and the newspaper 
 
Pravda
 
 commented: “This is the verdict of the Soviet people, the
verdict of honest people.”
 
4
 
 The Soviet authorities, who used the trial for a massive
propaganda campaign, even made a short documentary film about the trial and the
public execution, which was attended by more than 30,000 local visitors. This
documentary film was (at least for a short period of time) shown to the Soviet
public in Muscovite movie theatres in 1943.
 
5
 
 There can be no doubt that the show
trial and the propaganda campaign aimed at deterring further collaboration. 
During the postwar years, thousands of further trials against local collaborators
followed the Krasnodar trial, continuing even until the 1980s. And it seems
reasonable that the Krasnodar trial — being one of the few public trials — may
have served as model for subsequent trials against collaborators in the Soviet
Union. Reliable figures are as yet unavailable, but according to a recent online
publication of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), during the years 1943-
1953, more than 320,000 Soviet citizens were arrested for collaborating with the
Germans, which is nearly one third of all arrests by the NKVD during those years.
 
6
 
In the Ukrainian Soviet republic alone — according to a study by Ukrainian
historian V.M. Nikol´s´kii based on material from the Kievan Central SBU
archive —, between 1943 and 1953, the NKVD arrested 93,590 potential
“homeland traitors and accomplices” (
 
izmenniki rodiny
 
 
 
i posobniki
 
). But as
Nikol´s´kii himself admits, these figures may not be definite as yet. The majority of
the arrests (57%) took place during wartime and the direct aftermath of the war
(1943-1945).
 
7
 
 
If we compare this number with the approximately 100,000 Germans and
Austrians who had been convicted as war and Nazi criminals since 1944 all over
Europe, including 21,555 Germans (mostly prisoners of war [POWs]) who were
convicted in the Soviet Union, it becomes obvious that far more Soviet citizens had
 
3. See the complete trial documentation (microfilm copy from the FSB archive in Moscow) at
the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, N-16708, Vol. 1-13. 
4. 
 
Pravda
 
, 19 July 1943, p. 1.
5. The German journalist Bengt von zur Mühlen used parts of this original Soviet documentary
film in his TV documentary: 
 
Krasnodar 1943 — Der Prozess
 
, Germany 1985. The original film
is located at the Russian National Film Archive in Krasnogorsk.
6. See Oleg B. Mozochin, “Statistika repressivnoi deiatel´nosti organov bezopasnosti SSSR na
period s 1921 po 1953 gg.,” [Statistics about repressive activities of the USSR security organs
during the period from 1921 to 1953] available on the FSB website www.fsb.ru/history/autors/
mozohin.html. See also Volodimir M. Nikol´s´kii, 
 
Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoï
bezpeky SRSR v Ukraïni (kinec´ 1920-ch-1950-ti rr.): Istoriko-statystychne doslidzhennia
 
 [
Repressive activities of the USSR State security organs in Ukraine (end fo 1920s to 1950s:
historical-statistical research] (Donetsk: Un-tu, 2003), 206-224. 
7. See Nikol´s´kii, 
 
Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoï bezpeky…
 
, 206-224; 451-452.
Documents of the former Kievan party archive mention, for 1946 alone, convictions of more
than 29,000 homeland traitors and accomplices. See CDAGOU (Central´nij derÂavnij arhiv
gromads´kih ob´ednan´ Ukraïny - Central State archive of social organisations of Ukraine), 1/
23/4937, l. 313; 1/23/4954, l. 171. See also V.M. Nikol´s´kii, 
 
Pidpillia OUN (b) u Donbasi
 
[The OUN (b) underground in the Donbass] (Kiev 2001), 107-109 for a study of the conviction
of members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). 
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been convicted of war crimes under German occupation than Germans.
 
8
 
 This is
nothing specific to the Soviet Union: in other European countries the postwar
settlement with collaborators was much more intense and bloodier than the
prosecution of German war criminals.
 
9
 
 And, in the Soviet Union as in other European
countries, convictions of collaborators did not always proceed on a legal basis during
wartime and the immediate postwar years. For example, it was not uncommon for
NKVD special units to shoot collaborators without any trial.
 
10
 
 German
Einsatzkommandos from several places in the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine
reported that after the liberation of these occupied territories, Red Army units
executed numerous Soviet citizens who had cooperated with the Germans. In some
villages even the whole population was murdered because of its positive attitude
towards the Germans.
 
11
 
 If we look at postwar trials in the broader context of Soviet
trials from the late 1920s to the 1960s, it becomes clear that arrests and convictions
after 1940 still constituted a minor portion. The cleansing of potential enemies was
much more extensive during the 1930s than during the postwar period.
 
12
 
 
During the last years, Western research has shown a growing interest in
transitional justice, memory policies, and the transformation of societies after
World War II.
 
13
 
 However, these topics are hardly ever studied with regard to the
former Soviet Union.
 
14
 
 In particular, the postwar legal conviction of Soviet citizens
 
8. For the conviction of German war criminals in the Soviet Union see the excellent overview
by Andreas Hilger, “‘Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf?’ Die Bestrafung deutscher Kriegs
und Gewaltverbrecher in der Sowjetunion und der SBZ/DDR,” in Frei, ed., 
 
Transnationale
Vergangenheitspolitik…
 
, 180-246. 
9. See Frei, 
 
Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik…,
 
 32-35. 
10. See Aleksandr E. Epifanov, 
 
Otvetstvennost´ gitlerovskikh voennykh prestupnikov i ikh
posobnikov v SSSR: istoriko-pravovoi aspekt
 
 [The responsibility of Hitler’s war criminals and
their accomplices in the USSR: historical-judicial aspect] (Volgograd, 1997), 76.
11. Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten no. 54, 14 May 1943, BA (Federal State
Archive) Berlin, R58/224, p. 172; Ereignismeldung UdSSR no. 186, 27 March 1942, BA
Berlin, R58/221, p. 167; Letter from the Ministry of Propaganda (Generalreferat Ostraum) to
the Reichsminister, 12 February 1942, BA Berlin, R55/1289, p. 52-55.
12. More than 75% of the 970,000 arrests which took place in Ukraine during the years 1927 to
1961, took place before the war. This indicates that the cleansing of potential enemies of the
Soviet government was much more extensive during the 1930s than during the postwar period.
See Nikol´s´kii, 
 
Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoï bezpeky…
 
, 119-120.
13.  See for example Donald Bloxham, 
 
Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of
Holocaust History and Memory
 
 (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2001); Lawrence Douglas, 
 
The
Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust
 
 (New Haven/London:
Yale University Press, 2001); Norbert Frei, Dirk van Laak, Michael Stolleis, eds., 
 
Geschichte vor
Gericht: Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit
 
 (München: C.H. Beck, 2000);
Claudia Kuretsidis-Haider, Winfried R. Garscha, eds., 
 
Keine “Abrechnung”: NS-Verbrechen,
Justiz und Gesellschaft in Europa nach 1945
 
 (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, Wien: DÖW,
1998); M. Osiel, 
 
Mass Atrocities, Collective Memory and the Law
 
 (New Brunswick 1997); Istvan
Deak, Jan Tomasz Gross, Tony Judt, eds., 
 
The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and
its Aftermath
 
 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
14. For the prosecution of German war criminals in the Soviet Union see Andreas Hilger,
N. Petrov, Günther Wagenlehner, eds., 
 
Sowjetische Militärtribunale
 
, Vol. 1:
 
 Die Verurteilung
deutscher Kriegsgefangener 1941-1953
 
; Vol. 2:
 
 Die Verurteilung deutscher Zivilisten 1945-
1955
 
 (Köln: Böhlau, 2001-2003). 
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who collaborated with the Germans has rarely been a topic of historical research so
far.
 
15
 
 This is due to the fact that there is still no open access for historians to trial
records, which are housed in the former regional KGB archives in the successor
states of the Soviet Union.
This article analyses postwar trials of collaborators in the Ukrainian Soviet
republic under Stalin (1943-1953). It provides a first systematic study of the Soviet
trials with regard to differences in methods of proceeding, public involvement,
treatment of the defendants and witnesses, types of sentences, memory policies and
the political and social functions of the trials for postwar society in general. It is
based on documents from the former central party archive in Kiev and on the US
Holocaust Memorial Museum’s collection of Soviet postwar trials (1943-1980s)
related to the Holocaust in Ukraine.
 
16
 
 It seems reasonable that in many respects,
postwar trials in Ukraine are exemplary of the inner logic of trials in the whole
Soviet Union at that time. Ukraine accounted for at least one third of the arrested
collaborators in the Soviet Union. And in occupied Ukraine the collaboration of
Soviet citizens in local police units, administration and economy had constituted a
decisive factor in the successful implementation of German occupational rule,
including the Holocaust.
 
17
 
 At the same time, we must also keep in mind that there
 
15. A short overview on legal practice is given in Epifanov, 
 
Otvetstvennost´ gitlerovskikh
voennykh prestupnikov
 
…, 70-80. For an analysis of the legal basis and function of the military
tribunals of the NKVD troops during 1941-1945 see V.V. Obuchov, 
 
Pravovye osnovy
organizacii i deiatel´nosti voennykh tribunalov voisk NKVD SSSR v gody Velikoi
Otechestvennoi voiny
 
 
 
1941-1945
 
 [The legal base for the organisation and activities of military
tribunals of the NKVD troops of the USSR during the years of the Great Fatherland War 1941-
1945] (dissertation) (M., 2002). For Ukraine see Nikol´s´kii, 
 
Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv
derzhavnoï bezpeky…
 
. 
16. This collection, 
 
which to date
 
 consists of more than 600 trials records — mostly against
policemen –, was collected in the central archive and 20 regional archives of the Ukrainian
Security Service (SBU) — the former KGB archives. It presents a very unique and valuable
collection, all the more so as in Ukraine itself, access to this material (for both foreign and
Ukrainian researchers) is still impossible, with very few exceptions. 
17. The extent to which local policemen were involved in crimes committed by the German
occupation authorities in the occupied Soviet territories has only recently become a topic of
historical research in the West. See Martin C. Dean, 
 
Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of
the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944
 
 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Frank
Golczewski, “Organe der deutschen Besatzungsmacht: Die ukrainischen Schutzmannschaften,”
in Wolfgang Benz 
 
et al
 
., eds., 
 
Die Bürokratie der Okkupation: Strukturen der Herrschaft und
Verwaltung im besetzten Europa
 
 (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), 173-196; Dieter Pohl, “Ukrainische
Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden,” in Gerhard Paul, ed., 
 
Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische
Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?
 
 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 205-234;
D. Pohl, 
 
Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944: Organisation und
Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens
 
 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1997);
R. Breitman, “Himmler’s Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories,” 
 
Simon
Wiesenthal Center Annual
 
, no. 7 (1990): 23-39. On local government collaboration and
economic collaboration in the Donbass region see Tanja Penter, “‘Working for the Enemy’:
Post-war Military Tribunals of Mining Engineers in the Donbass,” paper held at the 2002
AAASS Convention in Pittsburgh; and Tanja Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass unter
deutscher Okkupation 1941-1943,” 
 
Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus
 
, Vol. 19
 
,
Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939-1945
 
(2003): 183-223. For perceptions of collaboration in Rostov on Don (Russia) see Jeffrey W.
Jones, “‘Every Family Has Its Freak’: Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia,
1943-1948,” 
 
Slavic Review
 
, 64, 4 (Winter 2005): 747-770.
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existed certain particularities in Ukraine which probably influenced both the way
collaboration functioned and the way it was dealt with by military tribunals during
postwar years. The most important of these particularities is the existence of a
strong Ukrainian nationalist movement in the western parts of Ukraine.
 
The practice of Stalinist justice: Arbitrary sentences, Soviet morality 
and efforts at professionalization
 
The prosecution of German war criminals in the Soviet Union started at the end of
1943. However, in 1941 the Soviet main court had already enacted a decree about
the banning of collaborators’ family members to remote areas of the Soviet
Union.
 
18
 
 The trials against collaborators took place at special military courts, the
so-called “military tribunals”. The whole system of military tribunals was
subordinate to the Military Council of the Soviet Supreme Court. The tribunals
operated like normal courts, according to the criminal laws of the different Soviet
republics, but they could — just like extraordinary courts — hand out the bill of
indictment to the defendant 24 hours before the beginning of the trial (normal
courts had to maintain a minimum term of three days). Furthermore, defendants
could not appeal against the judgements of military tribunals. Only death penalties
had to be reviewed by the responsible military councils and could be annulled by
them.
 
19
 
 Usually, military tribunals consisted of one chairman, two assessors and
one secretary.
In postwar Soviet Ukraine, there existed 31 military tribunals of the MVD
troops — 24 regional tribunals and six tribunals of divisions and one borderland
tribunal. They were all subordinate to the military tribunal of the Ukrainian district
(
 
okrug
 
).
 
20
 
 Later, in October 1948, Ukraine was divided into two separate — Kiev
and L´viv — jurisdictions. The Kiev district included the 16 regional military
tribunals of Eastern and Central Ukraine, while the L´viv district, the military
tribunals of the Western Ukrainian territories, which became part of the Soviet
Union only in 1939. This division was due to the particularities of the criminal
cases in these regions, as stated in a letter from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Ukraine to the Soviet Minister of Justice in 1950: “While at the
tribunals in the Kiev district criminal cases against homeland traitors such as
policemen, 
 
starosta
 
 and other traitors of the years 1941-1944 predominate, most of
the criminal cases processed at the tribunals in the L´viv district […] are cases
 
18. According to this, the immediate family of the collaborators was also subjected to state
persecution. It said that all adult relatives of collaborators, including parents, spouses, children
and siblings should be arrested and banned for five years to remote areas of the Soviet Union.
This decree was meant to deter people from going over to the enemy. 
19. The emergence of military tribunals in Russia goes back to the times of the 1917 Revolution
and the Civil War. See Mikhail S. Strogovich, 
 
Voennye tribunaly Sovetskogo gosudarstva
 
[Military tribunals of the Soviet State] (M., 1942), 3-24.
20. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4937, l. 309.
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against the OUN underground.”
 
21
 
 According to the Ukrainian party committee, the
division “led to a better quality in the work of the tribunals” and “served the
necessity of a strict and quick suppression of the OUN underground”.
 
22
 
 Most
interestingly, there were many more people arrested in the Western Ukrainian
territories than in the old Soviet territories (in proportion to the population).
 
23
 
According to a document from the former Kievan party archive, 61% of homeland
traitors convicted in 1946 were from Western Ukraine. Most of them were related
to the OUN and UPA.
 
24
 
 In these newly acquired territories of Western Ukraine, the
Soviet government faced more important loyalty problems and, as Amir Weiner
has argued, the trials were used for sovietisation purposes. The diversity of the
Ukrainian regions has constituted an important factor in the historical development
of Ukraine until today. And lines of social and interethnic conflicts within the local
societies sometimes diverged widely in the Ukrainian regions. 
Regarding the composition of the military tribunals, the majority of their
members lacked experience and education. In 1946, only 18 out of the 134 members
of the leading and operational staff had a higher legal education. It was therefore not
surprising that the quality of the judicial investigation was very low, and the trial
protocols of the regional tribunals “in many cases were rather laconic and
unprofessional and [did not] represent the trial in its necessary completeness,” as the
Ukrainian district tribunal stated in its 1947 revision report.
 
25
 
 In several cases, the
judges used their drivers or guards as jurors (
 
narodnye zasedateli
 
) during trial
proceedings.
 
26
 
 The Soviet government, which persistently tried to control and
professionalize the tribunals, ordered the implementation of practical courses and
qualification measures, but the majority of the inexperienced staff avoided them.
 
27
 
As Peter H. Solomon has shown, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet system
of criminal justice was mainly run by staff that lacked not only higher legal
education but even general secondary education. Justice was administered in an
amateur way, so to speak. However, starting in 1936, Stalin pursued a policy of
professionalization encouraging legal officials to acquire legal education. This
 
21. CDAGOU, 1/24/100, l. 230-231.
22. 
 
Ibid
 
., l. 231. 
23. While the old Soviet Ukrainian territories constituted three quarters of Ukraine’s
population of 41 million, Western Ukraine constituted only one quarter. Nevertheless, more
than half (58%) of the people arrested in Ukraine between 1946 and1953 lived in Western
Ukraine. See Nikol´s´kii, 
 
Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoï bezpeky…
 
, p. 572-573.
Documents from the former Kievan party archive confirm this. See for example CDAGOU, 1/
23/4953, l. 358-375.
24. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4954, l. 170-179. The document mentions 29,204 convictions of
homeland traitors for 1946, 17,878 of them in Western Ukraine. 
25. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4937, l. 318-320.
26. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4937, l. 320-326, 331.
27. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4937, l. 138, 331. See also Aleksandr G. Zviagincev, Iurii G. Orlov,
 
Prigovorennye vremenem: Rossiiskie i sovetskie prokurory XX vek. 1937-1953
 
 [Convicted by
the time: Russian and Soviet prosecutors in the 20
 
th
 
 century, 1937-1953] (M.: ROSSPEN,
2001).
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development was first interrupted by the Great Purges of 1937-1938 and then by
World War II. In 1946, Stalin continued efforts to involve legal officials in
educational programs. By Stalin’s death in 1953, this professionalization program
had yielded significant results. “Judges, investigators, and prosecutors acquired the
necessary skills and technical expertise to improve their performance but did not
develop an attachment to legal ethics or the values of the legal profession,” as
Solomon concluded.
 
28
 
 The Stalinist State intended to avoid the creation of a
modern legal profession, which might develop a sense of autonomy and power. 
Furthermore, shortly before World War II, Soviet legal agencies underwent a
centralization of power and authority that placed much of decision making in the
hands of republican and central authorities. In connection with this, the
performance of legal officials was more and more monitored and assessed with
statistical analyses. After the war, legal officials underwent an increasing number
of evaluations on the part of the political leadership. In 1948-1949, a new campaign
for the perfection of legal agencies started, which aimed to eliminate all symptoms
of imperfection such as acquittals and reversals on appeal. All this was part of the
larger process of bureaucratization of Soviet justice, which continued after Stalin’s
death.
 
29
 
According to Soviet law, the “Soviet judge, elected by the people, should enjoy
the people’s confidence and should be an example of honest service for the
homeland, of accurate and undeviating application of the Soviet laws and of moral
purity”.
 
30
 
 But the reality of postwar military tribunals was different: their staffs
were involved in several cases of abuse of office as for example falsification of
evidence and witness testimonies, use of violence against defendants and
witnesses, and corruption. It happened that a defendant’s confession was extorted
by violence or that defendants died under torture.
 
31
 
 The Ukrainian military
prosecutor and the Ukrainian district tribunal strictly investigated such cases and if
the abuse was verified, the proceedings could be stopped, and the responsible
employees were sentenced themselves. Depending on the gravity of their abuse,
they could only be dismissed from office and expelled from the party, or they went
to a labour camp for five to ten years.
 
32
 
 In other cases, judges who had made several
political mistakes in their punishment policies were forced to participate in juridical
qualification measures.
 
33
 
 In 1946, in Ukraine, 227 members of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MVD) troops and 41 members of the Ministry of State Security
(MGB) were convicted because of offences against Soviet laws; the majority (216)
 
28. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., 
 
Soviet
 
 
 
Criminal Justice under Stalin
 
 (Cambridge:Cambridge
university press, 1996), 364.
29. Ibid., 366-403.
30. CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, p. 67.
31. Only in 1953 was torture forbidden in the USSR. See Hilger, “Die Gerechtigkeit nehme
ihren Lauf…,” in Frei, ed., 
 
Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik…
 
, 210.
32. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4953, l. 370-371.
33. See CDAGOU, 1/24/100, l. 97-103.
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was sentenced to five to ten years in a labour camp.
 
34
 
 Until 1949-1950, these
measures were somewhat successful, but there were still 95-102 members of the
MVD/MGB organs convicted of similar offences. For determent and propaganda
purposes, several of the abuse trials against the organs’ staff members were
publicly staged.
 
35
 
 This practice shows the strong interest which the Stalinist
government had in a certain professionalization of the military tribunals. These
attempts even had a quite visible success — at least according to the Soviet
standards. This is most apparent in the considerable increase in trial records in the
more recent years, which is due to a more accurate preliminary investigation and
the application of more professional investigation methods. Whereas in the earlier
years most of the trial records were handwritten, an increase of typed protocols is
noticeable in later years. Besides, a decline in tribunal members’ offences against
the rules of the proceedings is noticeable: while in 1946 such offences took place in
394 trials, 260 offences were noticed in 1949, and 80 in 1950.
 
36
 
 The Kievan district
tribunal noted that the improvement in the work of the regional tribunals was due to
regular systematic investigations and analysis of errors by the district tribunal and
regular educational measures.
 
37
 
 The qualification of tribunal members also raised
slowly: during the years 1946-1950, in the Kievan district, 20 employees of
military tribunals received a higher education, and 16 a secondary education in
law.
 
38
 
 
The fact that the number of verdict revisions declined during the postwar years
is not necessarily a symptom of professionalization. More likely, it expresses the
growing pressure on legal officials from above.
 
39
 
 
How and when was an investigation started? Usually, the bill of indictment in
the various trials starts with the wording: “The regional NKVD office received
information about the fact, that…” Obviously, the defendants were very often
denounced by their neighbours. There was considerable public participation in the
denunciation of collaborators. Sometimes the local population even took the
initiative in arresting collaborators and handed them over to the NKVD.
 
40
 
 Besides,
there were two different investigative bodies which conducted investigations of
 
34. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4954, l. 176.
35. See CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 37, 63.
36. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4954, l. 178; 1/24/1178, l. 37.
37. CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 38.
38. See CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 66.
39. Whereas in 1946 in several regions of Western Ukraine more than one third of the verdicts
were revised, in 1949 only 12% were revised, in 1950 — 6% and in 1951 only 2%. See trial
statistics in CDAGOU, 1/24/100, l. 101. A considerable number of the defendants (between
60% and 70% in 1949) used the possibility to appeal against their verdict — but the majority
obviously without success. See CDAGOU, 1/24/100, l. 109.
40. But the NKVD could not always rely on such behaviour on the local population’s part. In
some places, especially where power had been replaced several times in a short period the
population was scared and would not report the collaborators to the Soviet authorities.
Sometimes people even hid collaborators.
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German crimes as well as Soviet collaboration in the liberated territories: on the one
hand, military commissions, which were among the first divisions to enter liberated
territory and on the other hand, the so-called Soviet State Extraordinary
Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Crimes Committed by the
German-Fascist Invaders and Their Accomplices, created in November 1942. 
The 1934 Ukrainian criminal law served as the legal basis for the conviction of
collaborators in Ukraine until it was replaced by the new criminal code of 1960. In
the group of crimes qualified as “counterrevolutionary crimes”, Paragraph 54-1a
referred to “treason to the Motherland”, which included “actions carried out by
Soviet citizens to the detriment of the Soviet Union’s military strength, national
sovereignty or the security of its territory, as for example espionage, passing over
military or state secrets, going over to the enemy and escaping over the border”.
 
41
 
This paragraph was equivalent to Paragraph 58 of the Russian criminal law on
“counterrevolutionary crimes”. The sanctions ranged between death by shooting and
ten years confinement with confiscation of property. For members of the Red Army,
the sentence was always death by shooting, as stipulated in Paragraph 54-1b. 
Besides, in April 1943, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union also enacted the
first union-wide normative regulation for war crimes, the so-called “Ukaz 43”,
which dealt with “sanctions against German fascist criminals responsible for the
killing and maltreatment of the Soviet civilian population and captured POWs, as
well as secret agents and homeland traitors from the Soviet population and their
auxiliaries”. “Ukaz 43” subsumed the crimes of German war criminals and Soviet
collaborators under one decree for the first time. It determined that spies and
traitors should be sentenced to death, and civil accomplices (
 
posobniki
 
) to 15 to 20
years of forced labour.
 
42
 
The corresponding legal regulations left considerable room for flexibility.
Therefore, the Soviet national prosecutor and Supreme Court even passed several
instructions to put an end to arbitrary convictions and curb the inflationary
imposition of the death penalty.
 
43
 
 In November 1943, the plenum of the Soviet
Supreme Court passed an instruction (no. 22/M/16/U/ss) about the classification of
actions by Soviet citizens helping the enemy in occupied territory. The Supreme
Court criticized the fact that — as practice showed — military tribunals classified
every action of Soviet citizens serving the German occupiers as “treason to the
Motherland”. The instruction explained how to differentiate between different
 
41. See Vasyl´ Maliarenko, red., 
 
Reabilitaciia represovanych. Verchovnyj sud Ukraïny.
Zakonodavstvo ta sudova praktyka
 
 (Kiev: Iurinkom, 1997), 20. 
42. See Manfred Zeidler, 
 
Stalinjustiz contra NS-Verbrechen. Die Kriegsverbrecherprozesse
gegen deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der UdSSR in den Jahren 1943-1952. Kenntnisstand und
Forschungsprobleme
 
 (Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut fuer Totalitarismusforschung, 1996),
16-20; “Der ‘Ukaz 43’: Entstehung und Problematik des Dekretes des Präsidiums des Obersten
Sowjets vom 19. April 1943,” in Hilger, Petrov, Wagenlehner, eds., 
 
Sowjetische
Militärtribunale
 
s…, 177-210.
43. See for example the Soviet national prosecutor’s instruction no 46ss dated May 1942 about
the classification of peoples’ actions serving the German occupiers, in Maliarenko,
 
Reabilitaciia represovanych…
 
, 44-45. 
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forms of collaboration, between “traitors” and “accomplices”. Accordingly, Soviet
citizens who served the Germans in leading positions in the local administration or
police, who provided the Germans with military and state secret documents, who
persecuted partisans, members of the Red Army and Soviet activists and handed
them over to the Germans, who participated in murder, violence against the
population and robbery of private and state property, and who served as soldiers in
the German army, were traitors and should be sentenced to death. People who
actively helped the Germans with the reconstruction of industries, transport and
agriculture and the collection of goods for the German army were accomplices and
should be sentenced to 15 to 20 years of forced labour. Two groups should remain
unprosecuted: Soviet citizens who cooperated with the Germans but supported
partisans and the Soviet underground or committed sabotage, and minor employees
of the administration, workers and specialists who just carried out their jobs, as long
as they did not commit any of the crimes named above.
 
44
 
 The main Soviet
prosecutor also instructed the regional prosecutors to review all death sentences
and immediately appeal against unjustified decisions.
 
45
 
 In May 1947, the USSR
Supreme Soviet abolished the death penalty for all crimes. But in January 1950, it
reinstated it for “traitors, spies, subversives and saboteurs”.
A report by the all-Ukrainian military tribunal in Kiev dated October 1943 gives
evidence of the arbitrary nature of the sentences pronounced by the different
regional military tribunals which, according to the Kievan tribunal, also led to
wrongful death penalties as well as to wrongful acquittals. The Kievan tribunal
complained that materials from the preliminary investigation were interpreted and
evaluated incorrectly; that there was no differentiation regarding the degree of
penalties; that there existed ambiguities concerning the judgements, and that the
tribunals very seldom considered mitigation of punishment.
 
46
 
The main charge held against collaborators was “treason to the Motherland”.
Sentences relative to actions evincing a “hostile attitude towards Soviet power”, as
it is called in trial records, were particularly severe. For example, defendants who
were connected to the organisation of Ukrainian nationalists often received
relatively severe sentences, sometimes the death penalty.
 
47
 
 In the Soviet hierarchy
of charges, “treason to the Motherland” figured at the top and was perceived as
even worse than “crimes against humanity”. Thus, in 1947, in the Tarnopil´ region,
when 13 local policemen who had participated in the murder of Jews, Poles and
communists were convicted, the bill of indictment stated that the defendants had
been arrested for their “affiliation with the organisation of Ukrainian nationalists
and their participation in the UPA”.
 
48
 
44. Maliarenko, 
 
Reabilitaciia represovanych…
 
, 47-49.
45. Epifanov, 
 
Otvetstvennost´ gitlerovskikh voennykh prestupnikov…
 
, 70-80.
46. CDAGOU, 1/23/684, l. 6-15.
47. See USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 1 (D. 43555); RG 31.018M/reel 2 (D. 43111). 
48. USHMM, RG-31.018M/reel 34/ frame 5615 (D. 1417). 
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Soviet citizens could even be convicted of treason and sentenced to several years
of forced labour for minor offences. For example, in Voroshilovgrad, ten former
 
Ostarbeiter
 
 were tried in 1942 because they “voluntarily went to Germany for work
and delivered anti-Soviet speeches in Berlin”. When they came back to Ukraine in
November 1942, by order of the Germans they spread rumours about the allegedly
very good living conditions in Germany. The military tribunal sentenced them to
seven to twenty years in a forced labour camp.
 
49
 
 This example shows the Soviet
authorities’ extremely broad understanding of collaboration. In the Soviet
conception of loyalty, not only people who had actively supported the Germans, but
every person who had been exposed to German propaganda and had contact with
Germans — Soviet POWs, 
 
Ostarbeiter
 
, and anyone who had stayed in occupied
territory — fell under suspicion of disloyalty. Therefore, repatriated POWs,
 
Ostarbeiter
 
 and even people who had just lived under German occupation were
stigmatised and discriminated against in various ways during the postwar years.
 
50
 
Such factors as “clean” social background and prewar biography, relatives in the
Red Army, activities in the resistance movement and expression of loyalty towards
Soviet power could sometimes have a mitigating effect. Therefore, the defendants
sometimes mentioned in their defence speeches that they came from poor peasant
families, had served in the Soviet Army and had been wounded or that they worked
hard on a Soviet kolkhoz during postwar years.
 
51 The case of a Ukrainian
policeman who was trained in a special camp close to the town of Travniki in the
Lublin district and was employed as a guard in death camps, is a good illustration:
in 1949, in Kiev, this man, who, according to German documents available to the
tribunal, “had proven himself in several actions against Jews and at combating
partisans”, was sentenced to only 15 years of forced labour because he served in the
Soviet Army after collaborating with the Germans. He was wounded twice and
obtained several military awards. During the trial, the defendant’s attorney argued
that he thereby “had partly made up for his guilt towards his homeland”.52
One characteristic of Soviet trials was that a person was convicted not only of a
particular crime but rather of his or her moral qualities and primarily his or her
long-term loyalty towards the Soviet state. This also significantly simplified the
search for evidence. Thus, in the above mentioned Krasnodar trial, the defendants
were (according to an understanding of collective guilt) sentenced to death just for
being members of the SS Special Detachment 10a while their individual guilt was,
wether investigated, not proven at all. Even the family profiles of the defendants
49. CDAGOU, 1/23/684, l. 6-15.
50. See among others B. Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Zwangsarbeiter vor und nach 1945. Ein
doppelter Leidensweg,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 41 (1993): 532-546; Pavel
Polian, Deportiert nach Hause: Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene im “Dritten Reich” und ihre
Repatriierung (München: R. Oldenbourg, Wien, 2001); P. Polian, Zh.A. Zaionchkovskaia,
“Ostarbeiter in Deutschland und daheim. Ergebnisse einer Fragebogenanalyse,” Jahrbücher für
Geschichte Osteuropas 41 (1993): 547-56.
51. See USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 2/frame 3701 (D. 2784).
52. See USHMM, RG 31.018M/ reel 2/ frame 4049 (D. 39455).
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were associated to the trials, which seems to be unique for Soviet war crimes trials:
if the defendant’s father, for example, was a former kulak, this could have a
negative impact. Having a brother fighting in the Red Army could be positive.53
Most interestingly, the same loyalty standards were applied to defendants from the
new Western Ukrainian territories as to those from the old Soviet Ukrainian
territories. A letter of complaint from a former policeman from the Tarnopil´ region
who was sentenced to 25 years of forced labour shows the confusion regarding the
loyalty question in Western Ukraine:
I come from Western Ukraine and I grew up with the awareness that my
homeland is (panskaia) Poland, and the hatred of the Poles for the Ukrainian
people has strengthened in me a budding holy patriotic feeling. And when I lost
my work under German occupation in 1941, I was forced to serve in the police,
but I did it not out of ideological persuasion but to make a living. Accordingly I
was totally unaware of the fact that I betrayed my homeland, as I have lived in
this new homeland for only one year. And this consciousness could not arise at
all, because in such a short period of time it just could not enter my head, my
crippled mind, corrupted as it was by anti-Soviet bourgeois propaganda. The
judge who sentenced me did not take this into consideration.54
Another specific feature of Soviet trials was the enormous importance of the
defendant’s confession, which not only compensated for the lack of evidence but
also had a ritual and symbolic meaning. 
The arbitrary nature of sentences becomes clear when we look at the trials
against other groups of collaborators, as for example people who helped the
Germans exploit local industries. Some of them — leading mining engineers in the
Donbass coal mines, for example — were sentenced to 20 to 25 years of forced
labour for “treason to the Motherland” even though they were not involved in
killings.55 The following case of a convicted industry manager shows the wide
range of interpretation at work in the trials. In April 1943, in Voroshilovgrad, the
director of an enamel fabric was sentenced to death for helping the Germans rebuild
and exploit the fabric, which had been destroyed by the Red Army. However, after
revision by higher Soviet authorities, the director was discharged because further
witnesses attested that his main aim was not to support the Germans but to save the
fabric from destruction.56 This shows again that the moral attitudes motivating
actions were quite hard to ascertain in the postwar period and could be variously
interpreted. In the Donbass coal mining region, for example, the cooperation of
53. According to a wartime decree of the National Defence Committee dated July 1942, the
immediate family of the collaborators was also subjected to state persecution. It said that all
adult relatives of collaborators, including parents, spouses, children and siblings should be
arrested and banned for five years to remote areas of the Soviet Union. This decree was meant
to deter people from going over to the enemy.
54. USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 24 (D. 33533).
55. See Penter, “Working for the Enemy…” and Penter, Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass…,
183-223.
56. See CDAGOU, 1/23/684, l. 8. 
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numerous Soviet specialists was crucial for the German policy of economic
exploitation. The NKVD noted this fact in a secret report after the liberation of the
Donbass in November 1943:
Several specialists who had a treacherous and hostile attitude towards the Soviet
motherland and did not want to be evacuated, voluntarily offered their service to
the fascist intruders for the active reconstruction of the coal mines and other
branches of industry in the basin. As a result, the Germans succeeded in
reconstructing the mines and factories, carried away about 2.5 million tons of
coal which were in the depots, and collected maps and other documental
materials describing the resources of the Donbass.57
The engineers and technicians examined the destroyed mines and gave
recommendations as to which mines should be reconstructed first. They provided
the Germans with “Markscheider” data, topographic and underground maps of the
mines which were of decisive importance for the success of reconstruction work.
Without that, reconstruction in many cases would have been impossible. Specialists
with a higher education degree organized the recruitment of the workforce. They
composed lists of workers and technicians for the different mines and gave them to
the local police, who gathered the workers, by force if necessary. Sometimes they
also composed lists of “bad” workers or unemployed people who should be
deported to Germany, and they took part in the “selection of Jews and
communists”. In some cases, the specialists devised cruel working conditions with
physical punishment and starvation for those who refused to work — sometimes
even without instructions from the German director. Several of these specialists
were convicted of collaboration during postwar years and sentenced to 15 to
25 years of forced labour. In practice however, specialists who worked for the
Germans were not all sentenced because the state needed them for reconstruction
work. Therefore it is not surprising that the majority of mining specialists, even
several of those who worked for the Germans in administrative positions, remained
at their posts after liberation. State policies here were rather pragmatic.58 
It says a lot about Soviet prosecution policies that military tribunals also
convicted a small number of Jewish survivors, mostly members of the Jewish
councils, of collaboration. These people often lived under Romanian occupation,
which increased their chances to survive. The trials against Jewish defendants
represent one of the grey zones, in which defendants were both criminals and
victims. For example the Jewish tailor Motel´ Iskovich Tsimmerman, who worked
inside the concentration camp of Pechery as a starosta, was sentenced to death by a
Soviet military tribunal in 1945. According to seven witness accounts, Tsimmerman
had personally beaten prisoners (who in some cases died from the blows) and taken
bribes. On the other hand, the defendant himself had lost his parents and his brother,
57. CDAGOU, 1/23/3839, l. 27. 
58. See Penter, Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass, 183-223.
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who were murdered under occupation. After protest of the Ukrainian Central
military tribunal in Kiev the sentence was revised to 15 years in a forced labour
camp. The defendant’s two further appeals to get amnesty were unsuccessful, but he
was released from prison earlier, in 1957, because of his good work performance.59
An even worse fate awaited the Jewish lawyer Adolf Samsonovich Gershman, who
worked in Zhmerinka in the Vynnits´ia region as head of the ghetto. During his trial
in November 1944, he was accused of instituting a cruel regime inside the ghetto,
beating and humiliating the prisoners, taking bribes and handing Jews over to the
German police. During the investigation, 32 witnesses were heard, but their reports
were quite contradictory. Several Jewish witnesses testified that Gershman had
beaten them for the slightest offence. Others reported that the defendant behaved
differently towards rich and poor Jews. While he bothered the poor, he took
measures of all kinds to alleviate the plight of the rich. But several witnesses also
testified that Gershman saved a number of Jews from being murdered by the
Germans. The trial documents do not contain any trial protocols or verdicts. But it is
known that Gershman was shot by the NKVD.60
Another interesting trial, against a Jewish woman, took place in 1946 in the city of
Uman´ in the Cherkassy region. The defendant, Ida Teplits´ka-Shkodnik, was
deported by the Germans to the ghetto in Uman´ and served inside the ghetto as a
wardress for the Jewish council. Her main task was to collect the ghetto inhabitants’
contributions to the Germans. She was charged with voluntarily working for the
Germans, forcing the ghetto inhabitants to work for the Germans, beating prisoners,
betraying Jews to the Germans and spreading anti-Soviet propaganda. But she also
lost her seven-year-old son, shot by the Germans. From the defendant’s interrogation
protocols we learn that when a house inhabited by Germans and located near the
ghetto burned down, the blame was placed on the Jews and six Jewish doctors, all
members of the Jewish council, were hanged the next morning.61 Nevertheless, the
Soviet military tribunal sentenced her to 20 years of forced labour and confiscated her
property. Ten years later, upon the protest of the prosecutor of the Kievan military
district, the sentence was reduced to ten years and Ida Teplits´ka-Shkodnik was
released from prison. The prosecutor argued that “Ida Teplits´ka-Shkodnik was
illiterate, that one of her sons was shot by the German occupying forces and that she
showed a positive attitude towards work during her prison term”.
The role of the Jewish councils under Nazi rule and the moral evaluation of their
members’ behaviour has been a highly disputed topic until today.62 The above
mentioned cases tell us that it obviously made no difference to the Soviet
authorities whether a defendant acted at the risk of losing his or her life. Therefore,
59. USHMM, RG-31.018M/reel 36/frame 0494 (D. 1994).
60. USHMM, RG-31.018M/reel 8 (D. 10875). 
61. USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 37/frame 4063-4152 (D. 1747).
62. See for a brief summary of the discussion Dan Diner, Beyond the conceivable: Studies on
Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 117-
129. 
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Jewish defendants did not receive any mitigation at the military tribunals, and
compared to defendants who actively participated in mass killings, they served
sentences that appear quite severe. It also can be noticed that there existed huge
differences in dealing with former members of the Judenräte in postwar times
inside and outside the Jewish community: for example, Karol B. Pohoryles, the
head of the Jewish council in Tarnopil´ in 1944 was sentenced by a Soviet military
tribunal to 20 years in prison, but for some reason the Central Ukrainian NKVD
annulled the sentence five months later. When Pohoryles was tried again in 1949 by
the honour court of the Central Council of the Jews in Poland, several witnesses
testified in favour of the defendant and Pohoryles was found not guilty.63
During the war and its direct aftermath, the Soviet Supreme Court complained
that sentences pronounced against collaborators by military tribunals tended to be
too severe. However, in the following years, 1946-1949, the Ministry of Justice
several times criticised the fact that sentences were much too mild and that several
courts “liberal´nichaiut” with perpetrators and looked for pleas to mitigate their
sentences.64 The military tribunal of the Kievan district mentioned in its 1950 report
that “homeland traitors often falsely sing the praises of Soviet power, influence
witnesses, falsify documents, etc., to get a milder sentence”.65 According to the
tribunal, mitigating factors had to be considered, but this did not mean that every
traitor who was also a member of a partisan unit, served in the Red Army, was
wounded and later decorated, should get only a minor sentence. The tribunals had
to find out in every individual case about the traitor’s real achievements in the
partisan movement and the Soviet Army. Soviet officials suspected that several
collaborators first joined the partisans when the Germans were already retreating,
or were wounded not during army fights at the front, but otherwise — by bombings
in the rear, for instance.66
Frequent breaches of the rules of court procedure by the regional military
tribunals constituted another cause for persistent complaint by the Soviet Ministry
of Justice. In many cases wrongful convictions were due to superficial and
insufficient pre-investigations. Furthermore, quite often the tribunals invited and
considered only witnesses of the prosecution, while they ignored witnesses of the
defence. The same was sometimes true for available documents.67 The Ministry
also criticised the form of the official verdict, which, according to a decree of the
63. USHMM, Centralny Komitet Ìydów w Polsce — sady spoleczne, [Central Committee of
Jews in Poland] ACC.1996.A.0223, file 313/ 99.
64. See decrees of the Soviet Ministry of Justice no. 018 dated September 1948 about “the work
of the courts” and May 1950, in: CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 39. As early as 1946, the Ukrainian
district tribunal stated that convictions of collaborators especially in several Western Ukrainian
regions were too liberal — which meant sentences of “only” ten years of prison. See
CDAGOU, 1/23/4937, l. 313-315. 
65. CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 41.
66. See CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 44.
67. See CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 55-57.
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Soviet Supreme Court dated July 1950, “represent[ed] an act of socialist
jurisdiction,” “had an enormous educational and social-political importance” and
should be passed “in accordance with the high principles of communist moral”.68
Due to the inexperience of the judges, the official verdict sometimes contained so
many detailed explanations that it seemed rather ridiculous: a good example is the
case in which there is a detailed discussion on why and how a bag with potatoes had
fallen on the floor.69
If we look at the number of sentences pronounced against collaborators, we see
that during wartime (1943-1945), a relatively high proportion of the defendants
(around 5%) were sentenced to death, whereas during the postwar years (1946-
1953), significantly less people (around 1%) received the maximum punishment,
which was partly due to the abolition of the death penalty between 1947 and 1950.70
According to a document from the Kievan former party archive, in 1946, out of
29,204 convicted collaborators, 21,265 were sentenced to a “minor” ten-year
prison term while 667 (2.3%) received the death penalty.71 But obviously, after the
Soviet Ministry of Justice had criticised the excessively liberal treatment of
collaborators at the end of 1949, the tribunals turned to a more severe punishment
policy, so that in 1950 and 1951 in the Kievan district, more than 94% of convicted
collaborators were sentenced to 25 years in a forced labour camp.72 Therefore, the
Kievan district tribunal concluded in its 1950 report that the subordinated regional
tribunals had “fundamentally correctly applied punishment against collaborators”
since the last quarter of 1949.73 Ukrainian trials differed from war crimes trials in
the West in that the defendant was convicted in most cases. There were very few
acquittals (around 2-3% of the defendants) as it was part of the Soviet campaign for
professionalization to reduce them.74
However, in most cases we can assume that defendants who were sentenced to
long prison terms of 20 or 25 years did not serve their whole term, and were
amnestied in the mid-1950s, after Stalin’s death. In September 1955, the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a law about amnestying Soviet citizens
who had collaborated with the Germans. But this amnesty did not include people
who had been convicted of murder and torture.75 In practice, amnesty and
68. CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 57-58.
69. See CDAGOU, 1/24/1178, l. 59.
70. These figures refer to all trials at military tribunals, not only trials against collaborators. See
Nikol´s´kii, Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoï bezpeky…, 443-451.
71. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4954, pp. 171-173.
72. By that time, the absolute numbers of convicted collaborators already had significantly
decreased. See CDAGOU, 1/24/100, 101.
73. CDAGOU, 1/24/100, l. 106.
74. See Nikol´s´kii, Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoï bezpeky…, 443-451; In 1946,
905 out of 29,204 convicted collaborators were acquitted. See CDAGOU, 1/23/4954, l. 171-
173.
75. See Reabilitaciia: Kak eto bylo. Dokumenty prezidiuma TsK KPSS i drugie materialy.
Mart 1953-fevral´ 1956 [Rehabilitation: How it was. Documents from the Chair of the Central
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rehabilitation seem to have been as arbitrary as sentences. Besides, thousands of
convicted German war criminals had already been amnestied and repatriated to
Germany since October 1953 — among them were criminals responsible for severe
crimes against humanity.76
Another specific feature of the Soviet war crimes trials were multiple convictions.
The Soviet Union continued to convict war criminals into the 1980s. The same
defendants could be retried under the same charges and without any new evidence.
For example, in 1948, the former Ternopil´ policeman Aleksandr I. Mynzar was
sentenced to 25 years in a forced labour camp. He had already been arrested in 1944
and worked several months in an army penal unit until he was set free after the end of
the war. The defendant Mynzar complained in a letter to the Supreme Soviet in 1955:
“How can it be that according to Soviet law somebody can be convicted twice of the
same crime?” In 1957 the sentence was revised to ten years and Mynzar was released
from prison. But in 1983 a new investigation of the case was started because of new
witness accounts.77
It is important to note that most collaboration trials under Stalin were not public.
This was also true of the trials against German war criminals in the Soviet Union:
several important public show trials took place, but on the whole, only 18 trials
against 224 defendants were public (until 1950).78 For the first time, the all-
Ukrainian Military Tribunal of the NKVD troops demanded of regional tribunals
that the trials against “traitors” be public because of the “huge political and
educational impact of the trials on the masses of workers”. It also happened that
local soviets and party organisations had the same request.79 Since the 1920s, the
Soviet government had used political show trials for the education of Soviet
citizens in the spirit of loyalty to the Motherland.80 In addition, a massive
propaganda campaign accompanied the few public trials against German war
criminals, turning the courtroom into an ideological podium.81 However, most
collaboration trials were closed to the public. According to a report by the
Ukrainian district military tribunal, among 633 trials against collaborators which
76. See Hilger, “Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf”… in Frei, ed., Transnationale
Vergangenheitspolitik…, 239-244.
77. See USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 24 (D. 33533).
78. See Hilger, “Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf”, in Frei, ed., Transnationale
Vergangenheitspolitik…, 214-215; Hilger et al. (eds.), Sowjetische Militärtribunale, Vol. 1,
Die Verurteilung deutscher Kriegsgefangener 1941-1953; A.V. Prusin: “‘Fascist Criminals to
the Gallows!’: The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials, December 1945-February 1946,”
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 17, 1 (Spring 2003): 1-30.
79. See USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 2 (D. 23828).
80. See Julie A. Cassiday, The Enemy on Trial: Early Soviet Courts on Stage and Screen
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000). 
81. See Prusin,“Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!…,” 17.
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other materials. March 1953 —
February 1956](M., 2000), 259-260.
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took place in July and August 1943 in Ukraine, only seven were public (four in
Voroshilovgrad, two in Stalino and one in Khar´kiv). One reason why the tribunals
might have avoided public attendance was — as it was at least reported in one
case — that defendants complained about the illegal methods of the NKVD’s staff
during the inquiry.82 Later on, it also seems reasonable that the Soviet government
was not interested in giving the collaboration issue too much public attention
because it was contradictory to the much touted myth of the Soviet people’s
unanimous resistance to the German invader. 
In general, there existed different levels of publicity during the trials. Only a few
received broad public attention in press reports. In some cases they were open to the
local public of a village or kolkhoz, but were not reported in the press to a broader
regional and national public. In most cases the trials were carried out at the place
where the crimes were committed. But even if the trials, as in most cases during
Stalin’s times, were not public, they had an immense symbolic meaning for local
societies. This was due to the fact that the collaborators’ crimes and betrayals took
place within the context of the community, which made them morally even worse
in the public’s perception.83 Therefore, the local communities knew about the
collaborators and participated actively in their denouncement. Sometimes, the local
population even took the initiative in arresting collaborators and handed them over
to the NKVD. The wish for revenge is often visible in witness accounts at the trials.
All witnesses had to confirm at the beginning of their testimony that they did not
have any personal grievances against the defendants. However, it often turned out
during their accounts that they had personally suffered from the defendant, that the
defendant has beaten them or arrested their family members, who later were killed
by the Germans. The testimonies are sometimes extremely detailed and mention
extensively if the defendant had stolen a loaf of bread from the witness or slapped
the witness into his face, etc. Furthermore, in talking to Ukrainians today, we learn
that many people knew about the trials against local collaborators from reports of
witnesses who gave evidence at the trials or by word-of-mouth tradition.84 We must
keep in mind that in a totalitarian state, these informal ways of communication were
of enormous importance.
Trials, justice and society
To what extent did Soviet postwar trials against collaborators serve justice? To
what extent were these trials mainly political trials? Regarding these questions the
overall picture is rather contradictory: on the one hand we see real war criminals
82. CDAGOU, 1/23/684, l. 6-15.
83. See J.T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
84. For example, in several interviews with local people in the Donbass region who lived under
occupation, it came out that they remembered postwar trials in which they were not personally
involved. 
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such as policemen who directly participated in mass killings sentenced to death or
25 years of forced labour. (For comparison: in Germany, policemen of lower ranks
who just obeyed orders were not sentenced at all.) And we also see that war
criminals, like the man from Travniki, sometimes could get a minor sentence of 15
years because they served in the Soviet Army after collaborating with the occupant
and obtained military awards, and “thereby partly made up for their guilt towards
their homeland”. And on the other hand, we see that Soviet citizens who in our
understanding were not war criminals at all, like former Ostarbeiter or women who
cooked and cleaned for the Nazi, or specialists who helped the Germans rebuild the
destroyed industries, and even several Jewish defendants were also sentenced to 20
or 25 years of forced labour. Unfortunately, we do not know how many of the tried
collaborators committed real crimes and how many were tried mainly for political
reasons. And of course, trial records alone do not allow us to draw any conclusions
about the actual scale of collaboration because they do not tell us anything about
those who were executed without any trial, wrongfully accused, or not tried at all. 
Traditionally the Soviet system of justice has been seen as an instrument of the
Stalinist state. Most recently Andreas Hilger, who studied Soviet trials of German
war criminals, confirmed this view and came to the conclusion that because Soviet
politics always had precedence over the law, the Soviet courts did not succeed in
clarifying and prosecuting German war crimes adequately. There can be no doubt
that there was no independent system of justice under Stalin. Nevertheless, it would
be too easy to interpret Soviet postwar trials as mere examples of the abuse of
justice in a totalitarian state. Postwar reality was much more nuanced and complex.
And whereas Hilger might be right regarding the more centralised trials against
German war criminals, the situation was different with the conviction of local
collaborators. Two facts seem particularly striking in this context: firstly, as the
above mentioned documents from the Kievan party archive reveal, the Soviet
government encountered difficulties operating and controlling the regional military
tribunals, which developed a certain autonomy and dynamic in their work. This
aspect still needs more research, but as it seems so far, the policies of the different
regional military tribunals might have as well depended on the individuals in
charge and their specific interests as in general on a more local understanding of
justice in contradiction to the policies of the Center. 
Secondly, the trials seem to have satisfied a strong desire for revenge, order and
the re-establishment of social hierarchies inside local communities. They were not
simply imposed on the population and directed from above: they also provided a
locus for interaction between Soviet authorities and local communities.
Furthermore, it seems that they provided (however limited) a podium for alternative
memory discourses which differed from the official Soviet one. This was of even
more importance as other public spaces where the local people could come to terms
with their experience under German occupation were lacking. While the Soviet
government during the immediate postwar years tried to establish an official
memory discourse on World War II (which had very little in common with the real
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experiences and memories of the population who lived under German occupation),
using the victory over Nazi Germany as an integrating factor for the heterogeneous
Soviet population, alternative war experiences could be addressed in the trials. Not
only did the trials allow the mass killings of Jews to be openly discussed, they also
addressed the forced deportations of workers to Germany, which gave the latter the
same status as any other group of victims, at the same time when official Soviet
practice stigmatised repatriated Ostarbeiter as potential “enemies of the people”.85
And, as mentioned above, the trials also discussed the pogroms against Jews and
Poles that occurred in several places of Western Ukraine. The Jewish perspective on
the crimes was well represented in the trials where Jewish survivors could give
evidence. Not surprisingly, this was mostly the case in the territories under
Romanian occupation, where the Jews had better chances to survive.
At the same time, we should also consider that the local memory discourse and
its expression in local trials represented a rather ‘atomized knowledge’, because the
Soviet authorities (at least under Stalin) prevented a broader public discussion of
the trials beyond these local borders. Therefore, the inhabitants of one village knew
about the German crimes and the collaborators in their village, but they probably
did not know what happened under German occupation in the neighbouring
villages or that collaboration was a widespread phenomenon all over occupied
Soviet territories.
In conclusion, the trials had at least a double function. On the one hand, they were
a demonstration of Soviet power, and intended to punish disloyal behaviour towards
the Soviet state. Especially in the new Western Ukrainian territories, they served the
aim of sovietisation and brought the population into line. On the other hand local
actors used the trials for individual or collective revenge. It seems reasonable that in
the end, they in fact served the re-Stalinization process of postwar Soviet society
because they partly answered the pressure “from below”. Here a similar dynamic
seems to have functioned, as Sheila Fitzpatrick has described, according to rural
show trials against Kolchoz officials during the Great Purges in 1937. At these trials,
which resembled a “political theatre”, the peasants were given the possibility to
participate as witnesses in the prosecution of their abhored Kolkhoz directors. Quite
often the trials were based on peasants’ denunciations.86
However, unlike the trials of the Stalinist 1930s, in which mostly innocent
people were sentenced for pure political reasons, postwar trials often concluded
with the conviction of real war criminals. This brought about a carnivalesque
situation in which the Stalinist regime successfully legitimised its postwar purges
by the fact that now, at least partly, real criminals were convicted. Consequently it
might be argued that postwar trials of collaborators even provided a delayed
legitimation of the political show trials of the 1930s. 
85. See T. Penter, “Zwangsarbeit — Arbeit für den Feind. Der Donbass unter deutscher
Okkupation, 1941-1943,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 31 (2005): 68-100.
86. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, “How the Mice Buried the Cat: Scenes from the Great Purges of
1937 in the Russian Provinces,” The Russian Review, 52 (1993): 299-320.
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Also remarkable is the symbolic meaning of postwar trials. It came out in the fact
that the demonstrative lawfulness was maintained not only in the few public show
trials, but in the numerous non-public trials as well. Obviously the Stalinist regime
intended to emphasize the appearance of lawfulness in postwar trials in
contradistinction to the purge practice of the 1930s, when hundreds of thousands of
people were convicted without seeing any judge or prosecutor. There can be no
doubt that the trials must have had an important symbolic meaning. Otherwise the
Soviet government could just have had collaborators arrested and repressed by
NKVD organs without any trial, as happened during the mass terror of the 1930s.
This symbolic meaning of the trials also becomes evident in the use of attorneys not
in every, but in a considerable number of trials. From these trials it becomes clear
that the role of attorneys in Soviet trials was very different from that of Western
attorneys: like in Western countries the defendants officially had the right to be
defended by an attorney assigned by the military tribunal. But in reality, it often
happened that defendants did not believe in the attorney’s qualities, rejected his
defence and preferred to defend themselves.87 Here, the attorney’s role was
obviously purely symbolic. In conclusion, it can be argued that postwar trials also
served the Stalinist regime for its own legitimation inside Soviet society and abroad. 
The value of trial records for historical research
As mentioned above, trial records have so far rarely been studied for historical
research. They undoubtedly present a very subjective and tendentious material. The
interrogation of the defendants and witnesses was often carried out by only one
Soviet official, and the language of the interrogation protocols indicates that these
people sometimes rephrased statements (thereby interpreting them) in their own
words when they wrote them down.88 In a few cases the defendants also
complained during the trial that the NKVD had used torture to force their
confessions.89 Nevertheless, trial records represent an extremely valuable resource
for the study of Nazi occupation and crimes in occupied Soviet territories. They
contain detailed descriptions of the Holocaust in different local settings, towns and
villages, and of life in ghettos and camps. Sometimes they even contain primary
documents and quite often, reports of the Extraordinary Commission. The records
of later trials, when preliminary inquiries were carried out more elaborately,
contain drawings and photos of ghettos and camps or crime scenes. In a number of
cases, the records may very well be the only source documenting the existence of
ghettos and camps or mass executions. For example, in Donetsk, the trial of the
87. For example, at the 1951 trial in Kiev of a former policeman, four of the five defendants
refused to be represented by an attorney. See USHMM, RG 31.018M/reel 2 (D. 46837).
88. This was the practice not only in the Soviet Union, but also in several Western countries.
89. See for example the trial against a Jewish defendant which took place in 1944 in Vynnits´ia,
US Holocaust Memorial Museum RG-31.018M/ reel 36 (delo 1994).
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head of the local administration is the only source, aside from a few survivor
testimonies, suggesting the existence of a ghetto in this city.90 Of shocking detail
are the accounts about mass killings, as the following description by a Jewish
survivor and trial witness of the mass killings of ghetto inmates in the village
Murovano -Kurilovtsy in the Vynnits´ia region, in the summer of 1942, illustrates:
In the morning of the day when this horrible incident took place, all policemen
and gendarmes of the village Murovano-Kurilovtsy were afoot. Several of them
circled the ghetto grounds, others entered the houses in groups and drove the
Jews out onto the street. Then all ghetto inmates — about 6,000 people — were
driven by the policemen and gendarmes in a convoy to Iankovo forest, which is
located two kilometers from the village Murovano-Kurilovtsy. I was myself
amongst those who were brought to the forest. The policemen and gendarmes
brought us Jews by groups of three to the edge of previously dug large trenches.
Then we were ordered to take off all our clothes. While we took off our clothes,
the policemen and gendarmes started with the executions. First, they shot the
women and children. They forced them to lie down in the trenches. Then they
shot them.91
Most interestingly, we learn from several trials that local perpetrators sometimes
organised pogroms against the Jewish community spontaneously and on their own
initiative. These cases show us in a striking way that Jedvabne was not a single
event, but happened at other places in Ukraine as well.92 Trial records contain
descriptions of pogroms in shocking detail. For example in the records about a
pogrom trial in a village of the Chernivtsy region dated 1945 we can read, in one of
the defendants’ report:
Around July 1941, after the retreat of Red Army troops from the village
Nepolokovtsy and before the arrival of Romanian forces, one night I heard a
loud noise in the village and stepped out into the street. At that time, Isachuk,
Kuzma, Polij, Lazar, Grigorij Bodnar and Il´ia Oleinik passed by. They were
shouting that the Bolscheviks were coming with the Jews to beat up the
Christians, and appealed to the population for a pogrom against the Jews. I, and
many others, believed this provocation. I armed myself with a stick and went off
to drive the Jews out of their houses. […] We led them in a large convoy to the
river Prut. We pushed them onto the bridge and clubbed them to death. […]
Then we threw them into the Prut. […] When, as it seemed to me, not a single
one of them was left alive, we went back to the village Nepolokovtsy. […] The
very next day, Romanian troops arrived in the village.93
At the trial, Jewish survivors remembered that during that day Jewish women were
raped by the local perpetrators and that the property of the murdered Jews was
90. For trials in Donetzk see Penter, “Die lokale Gesellschaft im Donbass,” 183-223.
91. USHMM, RG-31.018M/ reel 28/ fr. 6299 (delo 21215).
92. See Gross, Neighbors…
93. USHMM, RG-31.018M/reel 12 (D. 7833).
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taken by them. About 30 Jewish people were killed, among them women and
children. The tribunal sentenced three defendants to death, and two for ten years in
a labour camp.
Until very recently, German occupation of Soviet territories and the Holocaust
have been studied mostly from the perspective of Nazi policies and documents —
not the least because Soviet archives had been closed for foreigners until the early
1990s. But in many areas, the German documents on Nazi crimes and everyday life
under German occupation are rather fragmentary. Trial records allow us to study a
hitherto unseen, ‘from-the-people’ facet of the Holocaust. They offer us deep
insight into the Holocaust under different regional and local conditions in the
occupied Soviet territories, and into the social life and relationships inside local
communities.
Furthermore, trial records tell us something about the personal profile of local
collaborators and their motives.94 The investigation of Nazi criminals, their
mentalities and motives, has become a major topic of interest in historical research
during the last ten years. However, we still know very little about non-German
collaborators’ backgrounds and motives for collaboration. In that respect, trial
records offer extremely interesting material. At the beginning of every trial, the
NKVD collected basic information about each defendant, including date and place
of birth, place of residence, profession, nationality, citizenship, membership in the
Communist Party, level of education, social background, former convictions,
military participation in World War II, and information about the defendant’s
family members. This information, which seems to be quite reliable, can be
analysed empirically to reach some conclusions about the collective biography of
collaborators and their motives. But we must also keep in mind that the profile of
convicted collaborators may have depended as well on either the German
recruitment policies or, later, the Soviet bias in bringing charges.
Generally, if we look at collaborators’ biographies, we see that they sometimes
fought in the Red Army before and after they had collaborated with the Germans
and sometimes even received high military awards (which they normally had to
return after their conviction). It was not rare that policemen were recruited from
among Soviet POWs. This was especially true of the “Travniki”.95 We may
therefore conclude that collaborators mostly did not act primarily out of ideological
motivations. And this also shows that the official Soviet representation which
tended to divide the Soviet population into “collaborators” and “resistants” did not
fit the much more complex wartime reality. Quite often, there was no clear line
between “collaboration” and “loyalty” in people’s actions, but rather “moral grey
zones”. This also means that phenomena like “collaboration”, “resistance” and also
94. But, not surprisingly, the testimonies of defendants and witnesses provide more reliable and
exact information on the local criminals and police structures than on the German ones because
local witnesses tended to perceive all German police organisations as “Gestapo”.
95. See P. Black, “Die Trawniki-Männer und die ‘Aktion Reinhard,’” in Bogdan Musial, ed.,
“Aktion Reinhardt”: Der Völkermord an den Juden im Generalgouvernement 1941-1944,
Osnabrück: Fibre, 2004, 309-352.
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“forced labour” were in fact much more interrelated than historians have thought so
far and should not be studied separately but in conjunction. 
The life story of the Jewish woman Margarita E. Shevchenko from Donetsk,
who experienced the war as a six-year-old girl, presents a lively example of the
complex reality under German occupation and its aftermath.96 The German
occupation radically changed the life of the daughter of prominent Soviet scientist
and professor Evstafii A. Funt and his Jewish wife. Margarita’s Jewish mother was
denounced and murdered by the Germans during the very first weeks of occupation.
Margarita and her elder brother were saved by the Ukrainian cleaning woman Fenia
Chaletskaia, who took care of them like a mother for the rest of her life (thereby
calling into question the old stereotype of Ukrainians as nationalists and anti-
Semites.) Margarita’s father Evstafii A. Funt decided to cooperate with the
Germans and worked for them as a mining expert in the rebuilding of the Donbass
coal mines, which had been destroyed by the Red Army during retreat. After the
liberation of the Donbass, in May 1944, Funt was convicted of collaborating by a
Soviet military tribunal and sentenced to 25 years of forced labour in a camp in
Karaganda. The main charge against him was that he had provided the Germans
with underground mine maps which were necessary for reconstruction. According
to the Soviet tribunal, these maps represented “state secrets”. Funt denied his guilt
until the end.97 Though Evstafii A. Funt survived the camp and was amnestied
during the 1950s, he was never rehabilitated until today. Margarita and her brother,
who had hardly survived the German occupation (hiding at various places), were
stigmatised in postwar times as children of an “enemy of the people” and suffered
from discriminations until very recently. 
Ruhr-Universität Bochum 
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96. Personal interview with Margarita E. Shevchenko in October 2003 in Donetsk.
97. See trials records in the former KGBarchive in Donetsk: ASBUDO, F. 1, D. 26612, Tom 1-2. 
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